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Abstract 
Drèze and Sen are not entirely right in their apparent glorification of the roles of nongovernmental 
organizations in Bangladesh in An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions because they 
leave out and/or de-emphasize some important issues, especially those that are related to the 
problematic trusting relationship between nongovernmental organizations in Bangladesh and rural 
poor women. Nongovernmental organizations’ use of trust disturbs social solidarity in rural 
Bangladesh mainly because of their massive supervision mechanism that they undertake to sustain 
the so-called trusting relationship between them and their debtors. The massive supervision 
mechanism damages social solidarity also because it creates a tension between local norms and 
nongovernmental organizations’ neoliberalist values of “discipline, efficiency and 
competitiveness,” which nongovernmental organizations try to inject into villagers by their 
numerous social engineering programs, which are state’s responsibility. Nongovernmental 
organization monitoring has some psychological impacts on their clients that also contribute to 
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shaking social solidarity. The absence of a proper trusting relationship between nongovernmental 
organizations and rural poor women reduces the capabilities of the latter as a result of which Drèze 
and Sen’s glorification of Bangladeshi nongovernmental organizations and Sen’s capabilities 
approach are in tension. However, there are strategies that Bangladeshi nongovernmental 
organizations should employ to address the issues raised due to their massive supervision 
mechanism. 
Introduction 
Though Bangladesh is considered one of the poorest countries in the world, its recent successes in 
many important aspects of the living standards of its population get considerable attention in a 
recent book by Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen entitled An Uncertain Glory: India and Its 
Contradictions (2013). In this book, Drèze and Sen offer a comparative discussion on the 
economies of Bangladesh and India. They point out that Bangladesh does better than India in many 
aspects of social development though India is twice as rich in per capita income as Bangladesh 
(Drèze and Sen, 2013: ix). In their attention to Bangladesh, they leave out and/or deemphasize 
some points, especially those that are related to the role of the micro-credit model1 of many non-
government organizations (NGOs). They give credit to public and NGO sectors for their various 
programs that contribute to Bangladesh’s social achievements. It is this glorification of the roles 
of NGOs in Bangladesh that motivates Drèze and Sen (2013) to leave out and/or deemphasize 
some important issues which will be the primary subject-matter of this study. 
In defending my thesis, I make use of the insights of three philosophers: Michel Foucault 
on power/knowledge and governmentality, David Harvey on neoliberalism, and Sen on a 
capabilities approach. In criticizing Drèze and Sen’s glorification of the roles of Bangladeshi 
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NGOs, I use these notions to construct my theoretical framework. Adopting this framework is 
necessary to criticize Drèze and Sen’s glorification of the roles of Bangladeshi NGOs and their 
micro-credit activities on the basis of the empirical works of Lamia Karim, Rashedur Chowdhury 
(and Hugh Willmott), Palash Kamruzzaman, Anu Muhammad, and Jude L. Fernando. Organizing 
the paper in this way offers me an opportunity to develop existing theories on NGOs and their 
micro-credit programs by arguing that i) the typical micro-credit model of NGOs of Bangladesh 
is based on the idea of trust, which is questionable because it leads to the destruction of social 
solidarity in Bangladesh (which will be discussed in the fourth section), and ii) the absence of a 
proper trusting relationship between NGOs and rural poor women reduces the capabilities of the 
latter (which will be discussed in the fifth section). I believe that my discussion on these two 
arguments shows that Drèze and Sen’s glorification of NGOs in Bangladesh is not entirely correct. 
But before justifying this claim, in the following two sections, I will discuss my theoretical 
framework and NGOs’ role in Bangladesh’s progress following Drèze and Sen (2013), 
respectively. Then, I will explain the organizing principle of micro-credit programs of Bangladesh, 
and their relation to its social solidarity. In the last section, I will discuss some practical 
implications for the NGOs (and their micro-credit programs).2 
Theoretical framework 
Bangladeshi NGOs in their micro-credit activities employ the mechanism of surveillance to sustain 
the so-called trusting relationship between them and rural poor women. In doing so, they create a 
power relation between the watcher and the watched where the former executes their power 
through knowledge they acquire during surveillance. This way of understanding micro-credit 
activities of NGOs is theoretically supported by Foucault’s idea of power/knowledge. According 
to Foucault (1978), power exists only in exercise or in activity. That is, power is something to be 
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exercised. For Foucault, knowledge is inseparably related to power, and is always an exercise of 
power. They come together in discourses, which are systems of knowledge creating unequal power 
relations by determining what is believed to be true and what is not (Foucault, 1981: 57-58). 
According to Foucault, every community has its own discourses in the form of social norms3 by 
which it controls people’s conduct. As Foucault (1980: 131) says, 
[C]ontrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth 
isn’t the reward of free spirits ... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in 
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue 
of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each 
society has its own régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the type of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. 
So, for Foucault, the discourses or ‘truths’ are not initially ‘top-down,’ they are rather historically 
constructed through repeated institutional support. He argues that through the use of the power 
mechanism of discipline, society regulates the behavioral patterns of its members. As Foucault 
(1980: 93; emphasis original) says, 
There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses 
of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are 
subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power 
except through the production of truth. This is the case for every society, but I 
believe that in ours the relationship between power, right and truth is organized in 
a highly specific fashion. ... I would say that we are forced to produce the truth of 
power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order to function: we must 
speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess to or discover the truth. 
Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it 
institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its pursuit. In the last analysis, we 
must produce truth as we must produce wealth; indeed we must produce truth in 
order to produce wealth in the first place. 
In his later works, Foucault (2001), however, suggests that power/knowledge in modern 
society is replaced with the concept of governmentality, which is the creation of various rules and 
procedures that aims at achieving certain goals through surveillance. Foucault (2012) shows that 
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modern society exercises its power in governing conducts of its targeted populations in various 
institutions – such as schools, prisons, militaries, hospitals, etc. – through various disciplinary 
means of which surveillance is an integral part. In governing its populations toward certain 
objectives, modern states/societies execute their power understood as an inseparable relationship 
between sovereignty, discipline, and government (Foucault, 2001). The Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality “articulates with the work of NGOs that govern rural populations, particularly 
women, through a range of tactics, instrumentalities, and programs; but most notable among these 
practices is the regularization of microfinance as an instrument of power between a resource-rich 
institution (NGO) and its poor clientele” (Karim, 2011: xvii). 
In this regard, Harvey’s understanding of neoliberalism  is important. It is connected with 
Foucauldian concepts of power/knowledge and governmentality, which is particularly evident in 
the context of micro-credit activities of NGOs in Bangladesh. Harvey (2007: 2) defines 
neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade.” That is, it “rests on the idea that human interest is best served through the withdrawal of 
the state from welfarist policies. It is an economic order based on competition, efficiency, and 
entrepreneurship” (Karim, 2011: xiii). Since the turn of 1970s, neoliberalism becomes “hegemonic 
as mode of discourse” in almost all states (Harvey, 2007: 2-3). “Deregulation, privatization, and 
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been all too common” (Harvey, 
2007: 3). The hegemony of neoliberalization is so destructive that it destroys “[not only] prior 
institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but 
also … divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life 
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and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart” (Harvey, 2007: 
3). Applying Harvey’s neoliberalist insights to micro-credit activities of Bangladeshi NGOs, it can 
be shown that because of its lack of economic sovereignty, the Bangladesh government cannot 
meet the requirements of its rural people. As a result, the Western-sponsored NGOs were able to 
help people gain access to many services such as education, healthcare, employment, credit, etc. 
Hence, we see the weakening of state sovereignty, and the replacement of the state as the providers 
of many services with “a kind of parallel government” (Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 133). The 
weakening of state sovereignty happens when NGOs control the elected government and question 
the state as a single development agent because of their monetary power obtained from various 
donor countries and agencies. In this sense, when NGOs first come to provide many services the 
state does not provide to citizens, their activities may be complementary to the state. But these 
supplementary actions diminish a state’s authority over its people over time as a result of which 
we experience the loss of state sovereignty or state control and NGO services become obligatory 
or imposed.4 The neoliberalist attempts of deregulation and privatization subject Bangladeshi 
citizens to neoliberalist principles of “discipline, efficiency and competitiveness” (Karim, 2011: 
xvii), and thus, destroy their traditional social relations, which are based on harmony and 
cooperation. As neoliberalist agents in Bangladesh, NGOs through their micro-credit activities 
shape the behaviors of their borrowers so that they become subjects to neoliberalist principles. 
Another important concept is the capabilities approach offered by Sen (1979, 1985, 1992, 
1993, 1999, 2003). It “attempts to walk a line between welfarism and liberalism as the two major 
competing camps of modern political thought” (Tobias, 2005: 69-70). The capabilities approach 
gives importance on the freedom to achieve well-being, which is to be understood in terms of 
people’s capabilities. According to Sen, all human beings should be on equal terms regarding 
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capabilities. He argues that a person’s well-being is dependent on what he is “able to do or to be.” 
It is not just dependent on his possessions or income. Sen (1999: 3) defines development as “a 
process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.” By freedom, he means “capabilities of 
persons to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value” (1999: 18). Hence, 
development, according to Sen, is “the expansion of capabilities of persons to lead the kind of lives 
they value – and have reason to value” (1999: 18). Sen (1999: xii) thinks that freedoms or 
capabilities are both the primary end and the principal means of development. Freedoms as the 
end of development are constitutive of development in the sense that they enrich human life by 
removing substantial ‘unfreedoms’ or increasing substantive freedoms, such as avoiding 
starvation, under-nourishment, avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, enjoying political 
participation and free speech, having literacy and numeracy, and so on. Freedoms are instrumental 
to development in the sense that they enable other kinds of capabilities and allow people to pursue 
the goals they desire. Sen (1999:, xii, 10, 38-40) offers a non-exhaustive list of instrumental 
freedoms which are distinct, yet interrelated. They are political freedom, economic facilities, social 
opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. 
Thus, the Senian capabilities approach considers capabilities as necessary for people to 
choose the lives they value by removing all sorts of unfreedoms and expanding favorable 
conditions for social choice about the things they value, capabilities to pursue those things, and set 
priorities from a list of things and capabilities. Sen’s idea of development is the sort of 
development that favors the expansion of human capabilities, or freedoms so that both individuals 
and groups of individuals flourish. Sen’s capabilities approach is important to show how micro-
credit activities of NGOs in Bangladesh often reduce the capabilities of rural poor women by 
denying/undermining different instrumental freedoms. Due to the failure of the state which is 
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supposed to work for the expansion of human capabilities or removal of external obstacles to 
human capabilities, we see the rise of NGOs as neoliberalist parallel states in Bangladesh that 
govern its rural women borrowers toward becoming the followers of the principles of “discipline, 
efficiency and competitiveness” (Karim, 2011: xvii) that destroy our traditional social cohesion. 
Hence, the use of the Senian capabilities approach to determine the truth of Drèze and Sen’s 
glorification of Bangladeshi NGOs reveals that they leave out and/or deemphasize some important 
issues that reduce rural women’s capabilities. 
Drèze and Sen on NGOs’ roles in Bangladesh’s progress 
Being one of the poorest countries in the world, Bangladesh’s population struggles to meet basic 
living necessities. Hence, “it remains one of the most deprivation-ridden countries in the world” 
(Drèze and Sen, 2013: 59). At the same time, it is also true that Bangladesh, as Drèze and Sen 
(2013) assert, is making rapid progress in many important areas of living standards, such as child 
survival, life expectancy, immunization, fertility, school enrollment, etc. In the last twenty years, 
despite having a poorer economy than India, Bangladesh has overtaken India in many aspects of 
social achievement. Thus, we observe a puzzle if we compare economies of Bangladesh and India: 
though India is twice as rich in per capita GDP as Bangladesh, Bangladesh maintains a 
considerable lead over India regarding many social development aspects. 
Drèze and Sen (2013: 58-64) find three roots of why Bangladesh has made significantly 
more progress in social development despite being economically poorer than India. They are a) 
positive changes in gender relations, b) focus on the fundamental needs of healthcare and primary 
education, and c) realization of the importance of social norms, public communication, and 
community mobilization. I will now focus on them. 
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 Both Bangladesh and India are traditionally male-dominated societies, and are still very 
patriarchal in many ways. However, at the same time, there are many strong signs of 
transformations in gender relations in Bangladesh. Drèze and Sen (2013) think that since the role 
of women’s agency and gender relations is an important factor in explaining development, it can 
account for the fact that Bangladesh is doing better than India in many social development 
indicators despite the former’s poorer performance in economic growth than the latter. 
The second point that Drèze and Sen (2013) mention as the root of Bangladesh’s better 
standing than India with respect to many social development indicators is particularly relevant to 
health achievements of Bangladesh. They think that the wide range of NGO activities and sensible 
moves by the government in Bangladesh help lower the costs in regard to health-related issues. As 
examples of health-related practices, they mention the use of sanitation facilities, family planning, 
full immunization of children, and oral dehydration therapy for diarrhea treatment. 
The third factor that helps Bangladesh do better in social achievements despite its poorer 
economic growth than India is related to “the importance of social norms in health, education and 
related fields, and to the role of public communication and community mobilization in bringing 
about changes in social norms” (Drèze and Sen, 2013: 64). Drèze and Sen think that most of the 
successes Bangladesh achieved in the areas of health and education are due to the importance it 
gives to relevant social factors. They mention actions of grassroots health and community workers 
as examples of roles of public communication and community mobilization. Grassroots health and 
community workers are mobilized by government and NGOs. They go to houses and villages to 
help child immunization, arrange nutrition supplementation programs, encourage school 
enrollment, explain contraception methods, counsel pregnant women, and promote improved 
sanitation, among other things. In this respect, India falls behind though it has also initiated such 
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programs. But, according to Drèze and Sen (2013), it has many things to learn from Bangladesh 
about public communication and community mobilization. 
Now, if we look back to what Drèze and Sen (2013) say about the three important factors 
that are responsible for Bangladesh’s social achievements, we will also see that for realizing these 
factors they credit to both public and non-profit institutions. They say, for example, about 
Bangladesh’s success in low-cost pharmaceutical distribution, “Bangladesh has … made early 
strides in the development and distribution of low-cost generic drugs through public or non-profit 
institutions” (Drèze and Sen, 2013: 64). Their appraisal of NGO activities and their role in 
augmenting Bangladesh’s social progress is evident when they say that, “Bangladesh’s endeavours 
have been helped by flourishing NGO activities, from comprehensive development efforts to 
specialized micro-credit initiatives (led by organizations such as BRAC and Grameen Bank)” 
(Drèze and Sen, 2013: 62). They also give a lot of credit to NGOs in helping build women’s 
agency. They notice, “Very large numbers of Bangladeshi women have been mobilized as front-
line health workers (both by NGOs and by the government)” (Drèze and Sen, 2013: 61). Sen (1979, 
1985, 1993, 1999, 2003) sees development as a process of expansion of human capabilities or 
freedoms. So, we should understand Drèze and Sen’s discussion of the comparison between 
economies of Bangladesh and India from the standpoint of a two-way relationship between 
economic growth and the expansion of human capability. As Drèze and Sen (2013: x) explain, 
Growth generates resources with which public and private efforts can be 
systematically mobilized to expand education, health care, nutrition, social 
facilities, and other essentials of fuller and freer human life for all. And the 
expansion of human capability, in turn, allows a faster expansion of resources and 
production, on which economic growth ultimately depends. 
As mentioned above, Drèze and Sen (2013) illustrate how NGOs work to empower 
Bangladeshi women by giving them opportunities to work as health and community workers at the 
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grassroots level. They expand women’s capabilities by providing them with the means to develop 
their resources through proper education, healthcare, etc. As Drèze and Sen mention, 
Tens of thousands of grass-roots health and community workers (mobilized by the 
government as well as by NGOs) have been going from house to house and village 
to village for many years facilitating child immunization, explaining contraception 
methods, promoting improved sanitation, organizing nutrition supplementation 
programmes counselling pregnant or lactating women, and much more (2013: 62). 
Thus, it is clear that Drèze and Sen (2013) give a lot of credit to NGOs for Bangladesh’s 
social achievements despite its poor per capita GDP. This credit-giving has a connection with 
Sen’s overall ideas of development and capabilities approach. It becomes even more apparent 
when Drèze and Sen recognize Bangladesh as “one of the most deprivation-ridden countries in the 
world” (2013: 59). So, Drèze and Sen would say that Bangladeshi people are still deprived because 
they do not have the power of agency. As a result, they are not capable of making their choices. 
But to augment people’s, particularly women’s, capabilities, NGOs play a significant role. 
But I think Drèze and Sen miss an important point: though NGOs in Bangladesh do many 
positive things that help augment Bangladesh’s social achievements, giving credit to NGOs only 
along with reasonable public measures and overlooking other significant sectors in social 
development – such as foreign remittances and readymade garments industry5 – is 
epistemologically and politically flawed. The glorification of the roles of NGOs by Drèze and Sen 
(2013) overlooks many contested roles of NGOs in Bangladesh, especially their micro-credit 
programs. But in this paper, my primary focus is on one of the major roots – i.e., the trusting 
relationship between NGOs in Bangladesh and rural poor women – of such contested roles of 
micro-credit programs of NGOs in Bangladesh. At this point, I will demonstrate how the trusting 
relationship between Bangladeshi NGOs and rural poor women ruins social solidarity in 
Bangladesh. But before that, I will discuss the organization of micro-credit programs of NGOs in 
Bangladesh which is required for the subsequent discussion. 
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Organizing principle of micro-credit programs and social solidarity in Bangladesh 
Most micro-credit programs of Bangladeshi NGOs follow almost the same organizing principle 
with some differences that are not important for the present discussion.6 However, my discussion 
of this organizing principle is mainly based on the structure of Grameen Bank (GB). In GB, a 
Center consists of forty women who are further divided into eight smaller groups. Each Center has 
a leader who is elected by its members. Its regular meetings take place in a female member’s house. 
The leader of a Center is responsible for collecting members’ regular installments and handing 
them over to the NGO officials. If she finds any eligible person for a new loan, she recommends 
her to the NGO officials. As Fernando (2006: 21) reports, 
[I]n order to assess creditworthiness, group leaders make detailed assessments and 
inventories of household wealth, e.g. bicycles, flashlights, rickshaws, furniture, 
trees in the gardens, the number of chickens owned, electric goods, presence of at 
least one income-earning male member, the number of unmarried daughters and 
widows in the household, the ability to obtain employment and to borrow from the 
moneylenders. 
One of the unique characteristics of micro-credit programs is that all other members of a 
Center are jointly held responsible for the repayment of an individual loan. So, when a member 
becomes a loan defaulter, other female members must pay on her behalf; otherwise, they lose 
access to any future loans. Bangladeshi NGOs adopt this forceful approach because they want to 
“(a) maintain tight fiscal control over repayments; (b) police women borrowers’ financial conduct 
after they received a loan; and (c) enforce payment through collective punishment for individual 
defaults” (Karim, 2008: 17). 
When women members of a Center see any wrong uses of loans by an individual member, 
they relay this information to the NGO officials. This vigilance results in a kind of spying and 
causes unfortunate strife among group members (Karim, 2008: 18; Chowdhury and Willmott, 
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2019: 124). Karim (2008: 18-19) reports that when a member fails to repay, the rest of the group 
members publicly insult her or her husband. Often, they publicly shame the defaulter and her 
family by taking away her gold nose-ring that symbolizes rural women’s marital status, the 
removal of which is equivalent to divorcing or widowing. Sometimes they take away the 
defaulter’s cows, chickens, and trees and make her family bereaved of any means to food 
accumulation. Moreover, this public shaming takes an extreme form of homelessness if the 
defaults are large. Other members may then sell off the house of the defaulter which is known as 
house-breaking (in Bengali, ghar-bhanga).7 Sometimes borrowers are forced to leave “their 
villages just to get rid of the loan burden. It is evident in the increasing of rural urban migration” 
(Muhammad, interviewed in  Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 134). Sometimes we see newspaper 
reports suggesting that due to the failure to protect family honor, defaulter or her family member 
commits suicide.8 There are also reports that suggest that sometimes the organ-selling incidents 
occur to repay loans.9 A study conducted in 12 Cyclone Sidr-affected districts shows, 
Sidr victims who lost almost everything in the cyclone, experienced pressure and 
harassment from non-governmental organisations (NGOS) for repayment of 
microcredit installments. Such intense pressure led some Sidr-affected borrowers 
to sell out the relief materials they received from different sources. Such pressure 
of loan recovery came from large organisations such as BRAC, ASA, and even the 
Noble Prize winning organisation Grameen Bank. 
Even the most severely affected people are expected to pay back in a weekly basis, 
with the prevailing interest rate. No system of “break” or “holiday” period is 
available in the banks’ current charter. No expectations are made during a time of 
natural calamity. The harsh rules practised by the microcredit lender organisations 
led the disaster affected people even selling their relied assistance. Some even had 
to sell their leftover belongings to pay back their weekly installments (Pasha et al., 
cited in Muhammad, 2009: 41). 
Karim (2008) also mentions that sending defaulter women to jail sometimes results in divorce for 
shaming husbands’ families. By public shaming and dishonor, micro-credit programs of NGOs 
disturb social solidarity in Bangladesh. Karim (2008: 7) identifies it as the economy of shame. In 
addition to undermining social cohesion and creating or widening social division, this economy of 
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shame “is seen to bring further misery to the lives of the poor, and it has not brought the 
development, poverty eradication, and women’s empowerment that its proponents hail” 
(Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 124). 
At this point, I will demonstrate how this economy of shame destroys indigenous norms of 
social solidarity by forming a sense of distrust among Bangladeshi poor villagers who are known 
for centuries for their fellow-feelings. 
Trust, psychological effects of NGO supervision, and social solidarity 
According to Karim (2008), NGOs are means to expanding globalization and neoliberalism in 
rural Bangladesh. NGOs, for their micro-credit programs, get millions of dollars from donor 
countries and agencies “at markedly reduced interest rates” (Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 
126).10 Now, they are, in fact, more preferred than the government for developmental aid due to 
corruption, inefficiency, bad governance, and other factors at the state level, which are common 
features of any government of a postcolonial country. NGOs are now seen as more efficient in 
working more closely with local people and delivering services to them. In this regard, Lister 
(2003: 175) points out that NGOs are now viewed by many as “a magic bullet, which could be 
fired off in any direction and would still find its target.”11 Because of its lack of economic 
sovereignty, the Bangladesh government cannot deliver many of the much-needed requirements 
of its citizens. NGOs take this opportunity and, because of the aid they get from donors, are able 
to work with and for “the poorest of the poor” in Bangladesh. Consequently, NGOs have become 
the providers of many services including education, healthcare, employment, credit, etc., which 
are usually a state’s responsibilities. Hence, we see “the emergence of a new sovereignty, the NGO 
as a shadow state” (Karim, 2008: 8)12 “that challenged the state’s monopoly as development actor” 
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(White, 1999: 312).13 This is a testimony of Harvey’s analysis of hegemonic power of 
neoliberalism that challenges “traditional forms of state sovereignty” (Harvey, 2007: 3). 
 Because they acquire economic power (i.e., economic sovereignty) from donor countries 
and agencies, NGOs as shadow states are used to facilitate the process of globalization and 
neoliberalism at grassroots levels in Bangladesh which undermines the sovereignty of the local 
family system, and “replaces it with the sovereignty of the market through NGOs, contracts, courts, 
juridical subjects, and the remaking of subjects as a community police to safeguard their 
investments” (Karim, 2008: 6). In Bangladesh, NGOs work to subject their clients to follow 
neoliberalist principles of “discipline, efficiency and competitiveness.” As Ong (2006: 4) notes, 
“In contemporary times, neoliberal rationality informs action by many regimes and furnishes the 
concepts that inform the government of free individuals who are then induced to self-manage 
according to market principles of “discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness.” To teach the 
poorest of the poor of Bangladesh these neoliberalist values, NGOs initiate various social 
engineering programs including population control, HIV/AIDS management, primary education, 
voter education, etc. (Karim, 2008: 6-7; Chowdhury, 2017: 942). Their micro-credit programs are 
very powerful because they provide poor villagers with credit, employment, and basic living 
conditions. As Chowdhury (2017: 942) says, 
These elite NGOs use their influence to mobilize neoliberal ideas such as 
privatization, deregulation, and free trade. As intermediaries of foreign donors, they 
exercise economic, political, and cultural manipulation through development 
activities such as microfinance so that the free-market ideology prevails and 
minimal regulation is implemented. It has been argued that NGO activities reduce 
the influence of a government over time, and that this enables [multinational 
corporations] to maximize their profits due to the weakened institutional context. 
Karim (2008: 8) also points out that the mutual dependence of NGOs and rural people in 
Bangladesh through micro-credit programs establishes, for the first time, a connection between 
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rural populations and multinational corporations. This relationship transforms rural people into 
consumers of various products and inputs of multinational companies such as finance capital, 
breeder chickens, cell phones, seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides (Karim, 2008: 8-9). As mentioned, 
NGOs also take different social and economic programs that generate “new subjectivities and 
social meanings for people” (Karim, 2008: 9). Thus, we witness, as Harvey (2007: 3) says, the 
“withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision.” 
There are, however, not many studies to show how micro-credit programs of NGOs act on 
native norms, values, and cultural practices that result in many actions and behaviors inconsistent 
with maintaining social solidarity among rural people. But I think one of the roots of this 
inconsistency can be found in the very idea of mutual trust, which is one of the core values NGOs 
in Bangladesh, at least as they claim, hold in giving loans to rural poor women. Pioneers – such as 
Muhammad Yunus14, the founder of the GB, and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 – of 
micro-credit programs of Bangladeshi NGOs claim that their programs are not based on legal 
procedures and systems, but on mutual trust, accountability, participation, and creativity.15 These 
programs offer loans to the poorest of the poor without collateral  unlike the conventional banks. 
That’s why proponents of micro-credit programs claim that these programs are primarily based on 
mutual trust and accountability. Though I mainly focus on GB, all other bigger micro-credit 
programs of Bangladeshi NGOs in many ways follow GB’s structure. 
One of the major moral principles around which rural societies in Bangladesh are structured 
is the discourse of honor, and women are seen as the custodians of family honor. It is on the basis 
of this notion that villagers see themselves as morally superior to urban people (Karim, 2008: 10). 
So, when NGOs use the methods of shaming and dishonoring their women by taking away their 
nose-rings, chickens, cows, etc. because of their failure to repay installments, the entire family 
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takes it as the mark of dishonor to their family. Because when their nose-rings – which, as was 
mentioned, are a symbol of marital status – are forcefully removed, or other means of their 
livelihood are taken away, they experience public insult. This public insult spoils their honor and 
prestige. Even sometimes their houses are broken (as mentioned earlier) by their fellow villagers 
for failing to repay loans. All of these, as villagers understand, are due to females who take loans 
from NGOs. So, though GB and other NGOs do not take any collateral to give loans to rural poor 
women, the moral notions of honor and shame “act as the collateral for these loans. It is the honor 
of the family that is at stake, and which the woman represents. If the woman gets publicly shamed, 
the family is dishonored” (Karim, 2008: 10). 
Thus, any understanding of NGOs’ success of no-collateral loans and in recovering them 
should be understood in the context of the use of shaming as an instrument of social control of the 
poor, particularly of poor women in rural Bangladesh.16 Consequently, the undercover value that 
works from behind a veil to implement such a tyrannical policy is the so-called mutual trust 
between NGOs and rural poor women. But how? In the name of trust, NGOs solicit rural poor 
women and tell them that they believe in them despite their poverty. In doing so, they offer loans 
to the poor women. These poor women are forced to believe NGOs because of their poverty that 
results in a very asymmetrical relation of trust from the start of the interactions. Hence, when these 
women fail to repay the loans they are insulted, their accumulation of food is taken away, their 
houses are broken, and, in some cases, they are sent to jail. All of these are marks of ultimate 
shame and dishonor which are imposed by those who in the first told the poor that they were giving 
loans to them because they regarded them as trustworthy. When they fail to repay, they find 
themselves not only as shamed and dishonored to others, but also as untrustworthy to NGO people. 
So, the trusting relationship between poor villagers and NGO personnel (who are often from their 
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own villages or neighboring communities) breaks down. There are also many local news reports 
of suicides which result from these circumstances. But there are not many studies to examine 
whether these unnatural deaths are due to their failure of repaying loans, shame, or the breakdown 
of trusting relationship for which they even lose faith in themselves. There is a substantial 
likelihood that the breakdown of the relationship of this category affects their social cohesion. This 
breakdown of trusting relationship may also cause many loan defaulters unwillingly leave their 
own villages and migrate to urban areas (see Muhammad, interviewed in Chowdhury and 
Willmott, 2019: 134). 
Moreover, the issue is even more serious when we consider the dire strategy of monitoring 
an individual borrower by the rest of borrowers of her group, as mentioned above. This tight fiscal 
control via surveillance of the women borrowers on behalf of the NGO results in daily strife that 
harms social relations. As Sherratt (2016: xvi) argues, 
[T]he practice of lending to groups with mutual liability can turn borrowers from a 
self-helping source of solidarity to a coercive force for loan collection. … [M]aking 
group liability a condition of the offer of a loan foreseeably creates the 
circumstances where coercion is used (whether by the loan officer, an agent of the 
[microcredit program], or the group itself) for loan collection in practice. 
Monitoring an individual woman’s activities with loans by other women is tantamount to spying. 
The psychological costs of being spied on, monitored, or under massive surveillance are 
detrimental. These costs reduce capabilities of rural poor women as well.17 One of the 
psychological consequences of being under massive supervision is suicide. Ernest Hemingway 
committed suicide because of being tracked and hounded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) (see, for details, Hoover, 2011). So, it will not be an exaggeration to claim that rural poor 
women and their families who take loans from NGOs go through cases of anxiety due to strict 
monitoring by other female borrowers.18 It also makes sense that women borrowers may feel more 
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afraid of NGOs when they think they are being monitored. Their trust (if trust plays any role at 
all!) in NGOs may decrease when they see that they are being monitored.19 This distrusting 
relationship causes what Chowdhury (2019: 3) calls “emotional wounds” which are “invisible dark 
marks in the collective archetypical memory of communities that, in the long run, affect 
interpersonal relationships of community members.”  
If people are aware that they are being monitored, they usually become more guarded in 
communication.20 Surveillance, then, tends to create perceptions and expectations of dishonesty 
(see Miller et al., 2005). The growing mutual distrust between NGOs and rural poor women leads 
to hostility among villagers that breeds a noxious social atmosphere and individual sense of 
discomfort and suspicion. They may subtly change their behavior and communication to conform 
to the expectations of the watcher. I think this commonsensical point makes sense in the area of 
the NGO-rural women relationships. Sometimes the borrowers cunningly lie to the NGO officers 
to meet the expectations of NGOs. Karim mentions one such incident of lying. The husband of a 
debtor said the following to Karim during her research, 
We took a cow loan. Fifty percent will be spent to pay off old debts, and another 
fifty percent will be invested in moneylending. If the manager comes to see our 
cow, we can easily borrow one from the neighbors (Karim, 2008: 16). 
An organized incident of lying is also reported by Kamruzzaman (2013: 37). He mentions 
that field-level NGO officials are asked to organize meetings between central bosses and poor 
villagers to meet donor agencies’ demand of grassroot participation. So, they bring those villagers 
to these meetings who would “echo the voices from the top” (Kamruzzaman, 2013: 37). This sort 
of organized lying serves at least two functions: fulfilling the requirement of participation, and 
thwarting the happening of any awakward situation in front of higher officials. This is also true in 
the context of microcredit where female leaders often organize various meetings between 
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borrowers and NGO officials. By serving these two functions of orgnized lying through which 
important information is filtered out, local NGO officials and female microcredit leaders play the 
gatekeeping role.21 
Here, my point is that this sort of simple lie can be the start of forming the habit of lying. 
Individual’s actions over time may give rise to a new habit. As Aristotle says, “virtues … are 
brought to completion through habit” (2014: 21). Thus, the simple lying about and hiding the use 
of money that rural poor women took as loans may result in the formation of a vice that they may 
apply to their other social dealings. This may result in a lack of trust and confidence in social 
relationships. Consequently, people may feel less willingness to promote real intimacy and mutual 
understanding. In this way, we see NGO’s monitoring as causing problems at multiple levels for 
rural society. 
One of these problems involves the rise of class divisions between the watcher and the 
watched based on the power of observation. The method of surveillance that is reputedly adopted 
to sustain the trusting relationship between NGOs and rural poor women is basically to amplify 
and exaggerate the sense of power in NGOs who do the watching because they are holders of 
power over financial and legal systems, and over political realms. It also enhances the sense of 
powerlessness in rural poor women who are being watched. So, following Foucault (2012), we 
can say that the scenario of watcher/watched is mainly about power. That is, the trusting 
relationship between NGOs and rural poor women in Bangladesh is predominantly a relationship 
of power which is no less than a relationship of domination and subordination. Foucault is well-
aware that knowledge is insidiously related to power. Following this Foucauldian line of argument, 
we can say that each time NGOs monitor the activities and behavior of rural poor women, the 
former acquire new knowledge about the latter that likewise increases the power of NGOs. 
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Consequently, NGOs’ power is used to shape the reality of rural society in Bangladesh. Their 
knowledge becomes ‘truth.’ The perspectives of the people of rural societies in Bangladesh, 
accordingly, become delegitimized, or worse, criminalized, and, in some cases, their voices are 
silenced22. Hence, to NGOs in Bangladesh, neoliberalist values of “discipline, efficiency, and 
competitiveness” become the values that are most important values that should be learned by the 
rural poor. The outcome of such neoliberalist truth of NGOs is that they have managed to create 
direct confrontations with local values of cooperation and harmonious living by instigating notions 
of selfishness and competition among rural poor women. One of the consequences of such value 
insertion takes the form of intense supervision, as mentioned above. Because of their newly learned 
selfishness and must-win mentality, many rural women cannot bear to willingly lose anything 
because of another’s actions; that shows that they are on the verge of losing their sacrificial 
mentality. So, following the NGO instructions, they monitor other borrowers’ activities that would 
preempt any loss of their money. In fact, they become so desperate that they do not even hesitate 
to break another’s house to compensate for the amount of default loans. Moreover, they are no 
longer ready to sacrifice their demands that would help their neighbors who are in danger as shown 
by the study conducted in 12 Cyclone Sidr-affected districts mentioned above.23 This is one way 
by which micro-credit programs of NGOs in Bangladesh damage social solidarity in the name of 
trusting rural poor women. 
As mentioned, NGOs for micro-credit activities in Bangladesh have a mechanism by which 
they elect a woman as the leader of a group of females. This leader is usually very persuasive and 
has some influence on other women. If any woman fails to repay her loans within a given time, 
the leader takes various measures, one of which is house-breaking. Karim (2008: 20-23) describes 
a story of a leader named Jahanara who was asked, “Why do you break the houses of kin?” At 
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first, she replied, “Why shouldn’t we? They have breached their trust with us. If they cannot pay, 
then we will have to pay. Why should I pay for them? (Karim, 2008: 23).” Then she added as 
mentioned by Karim (2008: 23), 
It is not good to break someone’s house, but we are forced to do it. This is how we 
get loans from Grameen Bank and other NGOs. They put pressure on us to recover 
the money, then we all get together and force the defaulting member to give us the 
money. We don’t care how we do it. 
Traditionally, in Bangladesh, it has been unthinkable that one kin breaks another’s house 
or forces that person to leave his or her own village to serve the purpose of a third party. Now, 
forced by NGOs, they are breaking another’s house because of which one kin cannot rely on other. 
There grows a sort of distrust, which disturbs social solidarity. This is the type of solidarity for 
which one villager stands beside another when s/he is in danger. Now, they destroy another’s house 
because of the pressure of collecting default loans exerted by the NGOs. But if micro-credit did 
not exert pressure, one kin would not destroy another’s house when she defaults on her loans. This 
is due to the neoliberalist lesson of selfishness that helps form a comprador class24 in the village 
ready to do anything for multinational corporations and donor agencies because it becomes a 
matter of survival for them. As Fernando (2006: 22-23) says, 
Peer group pressure, the substitute for conventional collateral, is derived from 
existing institutional and power relations. The issue at stake from the point of view 
of empowerment is whether the use of peer group pressure weakens or strengthens 
the institutions that are oppressive to women. The field officers of NGOs, women, 
and those institutions that are implicated in microcredit programs, are aware of the 
fact that their mutual survival depends on the ability to maintain the required rates 
of loan repayment. The exerting of any pressures on potential defaulters are 
legitimate actions sanctioned by the community. Lives of women and their 
households enjoy less “autonomy” from the larger society, resulting in serious 
consequences for women in terms of their economic and social well-being as they 
bear the ultimate responsibility for repayment of loans. 
In this connection, the instrumental value of trust is imperative. Trust helps create an 
environment necessary for cooperation (Gambetta, 1988). It enhances cooperation (Skyrms, 2008). 
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Cooperation through promising (such as the NGO-rural women relation) is impossible without 
trust (McLeod, 2015). As Friedrich and Southwood point out, “making a promise involves inviting 
another individual to trust one to do something” (2011: 277). It is true that the promise of paying 
loans back in a timely manner and using them properly functions within the trusting relationship 
between NGOs and rural poor women. Hence, NGOs in Bangladesh deploy the mechanism of 
supervision to oversee whether rural poor women keep their promises. This sort of monitoring 
makes the association forceful25, which hinders the development of trust because it does not 
promote intimate interactions between NGOs and rural poor women. Stolle (1998) argues that 
“membership in voluntary associations should increase face-to-face interactions between people 
and create a setting” (Stolle, 1998: 500). 
The above-mentioned story about Jahanara shows that though she was initially happy, she 
did not need to pay other borrower’s loans because she was breaking that particular borrower’s 
house to sell. Her happiness faded away the moment she discovered that she was forced to do it 
and she was also monitored. So, such newly acquired values do not necessarily bring the desired 
happiness to many borrowers. In Bangladeshi rural societies, one of the sources of happiness is 
the ability to do something for others. That is, the mentality of cooperation is seen to be one of the 
primary sources of happiness in rural societies in Bangladesh. But the objective of using 
surveillance to sustain a trusting relationship between NGOs and rural poor women generates, at 
least in many cases, the opposite: a society of selfish, competitive, and unhappy citizens whose 
sense of individualism chronically increases because of which native social moral values26, which 
are necessary to strengthen social solidarity and harmony, have started to fade away. 
I will now examine how the economy of shame that destroys indigenous norms of social 
solidarity by forming a sense of distrust among Bangladeshi poor villagers, who are known for 
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centuries for their fellow-feelings, reduces capabilities of rural poor women. This discussion will 
give us a clearer perspective on how I extend the work of Lamia Karim, Rashedur Chowdhury, 
Anu Muhammad, and others to criticize Drèze and Sen’s glorification of NGOs and their micro-
credit activities. I show how Drèze and Sen’s glorification of NGOs and their micro-credit 
activities are problematic using Sen’s capabilities approach that I explained above. 
Drèze and Sen’s glorification of NGOs and Sen’s capabilities approach are in tension 
Sen, on the one hand, prescribes measures to avoid starvation in order to increase substantive 
freedom, and on the other hand, glorifies the role of NGOs in Bangladesh to help people avoid 
starvation and undernutrition or malnutrition. Unfortunately, the same NGOs leave people with no 
food by taking away their cows, chicks, rice, grain, plants, etc. which they use as food or 
accumulate to buy food when someone fails to repay the loans they took from the NGOs. NGOs 
also, for failure to repay loans, break people’s homes, and make people homeless. Thus, sometimes 
NGOs in Bangladesh work to reduce economic and social opportunities by making them 
vulnerable to unexpected morbidity and mortality. NGOs are also responsible for leaving people 
without any access to economic resources for consumption, production, or exchange. Besides, 
NGOs fail to provide rural poor women with social safety as they expose them to starvation, 
malnutrition, homelessness, etc. In this way, NGOs in Bangladesh deny protective security to rural 
poor women, though they come to allow them access to social safety nets so that they can avoid 
great sufferings in the camouflage of shadow states.   
Political freedom, in Sen’s political philosophy of development, is one of the most 
important components, since it ensures public participation in political processes through election, 
free speech, etc. In Bangladesh, the very NGOs, who through their social engineering programs 
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motivate people to vote in various national and local elections (and thus, increase people’s political 
freedoms), depoliticize political possibilities. Knowing their influence on rural poor women, 
political parties maintain a friendly relation with NGOs. Accordingly, NGOs urge borrowers to 
cast their vote in favor of more NGO-friendly candidates (Karim, 2008: 11-13). For this reason, 
national political parties see NGOs as their vote banks (Karim, 2001: 99). But, “while NGOs can 
subject the poor to their will, they do not control the choices people make [through] the financial 
imperatives of NGO lending institutions, i.e. the management of rural populations through micro-
credit that tends to depoliticize political possibilities” (Karim, 2008: 12; also, see Ferguson, 1994). 
Another process of depoliticization is NGO-sponsored silencing projects, as mentioned above. To 
suppress dissenting voices, NGOs and their supporters sometimes advise Bangladeshi publishers 
not to publish any books that are critical of their micro-credit programs. “As early as 2001, Aminur 
Rahman, a Bangladeshi anthropologist, published a highly controversial book on microcredit that 
challenged its effectiveness and pointed to its dark side” (Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 124; 
see also Karim, 2008: 23-24).27 But the publication of this book through any Bangladeshi 
publishing house was impossible due to Rahman’s criticisms of micro-credit (Karim, 2008: 23-
24). NGOs also silence dissenting voices by providing university professors and researchers with 
various opportunities of consultancy and teaching. As a result, these university professors and 
researchers become what Constantino (2000: 425) calls comprador intellectuals who justify all 
neoliberalist models and discredit any alternative to them. Since these groups of people have 
recently become unable to criticize numerous wrong-doings of NGOs, rural poor people are left 
with very little knowledge of such activities, which may result in capability reduction rather than 
augmentation. Different aspects of depoliticization that include influencing voter’s behavior by 
the use of monetary power, silencing the dissents, and so on are obstacles to democracy, which 
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Sen regards as substantive freedoms that we have reason to value. Despite their importance to the 
development of human capabilities, NGOs, to some extent, are weakening democratic processes 
of Bangladesh, which are evident from their projects of depoliticization. Thus, NGOs not only help 
increase human capabilities, but they also have reductive impacts on human capabilities. This 
discussion shows the possible danger of Sen’s assumption that an ideal democracy is not 
categorically important for the development. The absence of proper democracy invites different 
NGOs to devilishly play their role in offering many services that are the government’s 
responsibility. Due to a lack of good governance, NGOs can manage to sidestep state rules and 
regulations in many cases and grow as shadow states in different parts of Bangladesh, as mentioned 
above. As a result, NGOs in Bangladesh serve to undermine the development of human capabilities 
by weakening its democracy. As Roper (2013: 467) aptly puts it, “In general, the weakening of the 
state reduces its ability to address its own shortcomings, strengthen democratic governance, and 
work to enhance the capabilities of its population even through such basic services as health and 
education.” Moreover, sometimes it is argued that women’s empowerment is increased due to the 
influence of micro-credit. To illustrate this empowerment, women’s numerical visibility in 
microcredit meetings and activities are mentioned (Fernando, 2006: 22). But Fernando is 
suspicious about showing numerical visibility as success story of women’s empowerment. As he 
says, 
Numerical visibility of women in microcredit programs is a highly misleading 
indicator of qualitative dimensions of their empowerment. The numerical strength 
of women in these credit programs does not automatically translate into qualitative 
changes in their social status. It is not logical to argue that the public domains of 
women now framed by microcredit programs are more empowering than their 
traditional public and private spheres. … I argue that the institutional relations that 
women experience in the public sphere after they join the microcredit programs 
have resulted in further impediments for their empowerment. In fact, the 
institutional relations that underpin the microcredit programs may suppress the 
potentialities of local sources of empowerment. Current studies take the superiority 
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of public domain over private domain for granted, instead of examining how the 
institutional relations within and between them are framed by microcredit and the 
resulting consequences for women. Ironically, such claims about private-public 
boundaries are often associated with those that are vehemently committed to 
uncovering the liberating potentials of those at the margins of the society or the 
subalterns through indigenous knowledge and strategies of resistance (Fernando, 
2006: 22). 
The problem of capability reduction by NGOs becomes very grave if we consider it from 
the perspective of transparency guarantees, which is one of the instrumental freedoms as 
mentioned in Sen (1999). Although I believe this issue deserves a separate study, a few remarks 
can be made here. The most unsettling criticisms of NGOs in Bangladesh, according to Mahbubul 
Karim (1996: 138), is the one that relates to the question of legitimacy and accountability. Since 
NGOs in Bangladesh are mostly financially dependent on external sources, there have always been 
questions about NGOs’ spending accountability to governments, donors, and the general public. 
But since governments suffer from corruption and inefficiency, the general public are deprived of 
influence on NGOs, and donors are concerned with their hidden agendas being actualized, NGOs 
remain unaccountable to anyone regarding their earnings and expenses. Moreover, donor countries 
and agencies cannot avoid their responsibility in reducing human capabilities because many NGOs 
are either donor-created or donor-led systems (Porter, 2003: 141; Tvedt, 1998: 75; Roper, 2013: 
464). By being unaccountable, they sometimes open the door for corruption, financial 
irresponsibility, and underhanded dealings. The presence of these is problematic for creating an 
environment of trust. As Sen recognizes, “When that trust is seriously violated, the lives of many 
people … may be adversely affected by the lack of openness” (1999: 39-40). Thus, NGOs in 
Bangladesh sometimes play the role of obstacles to freedom of rural poor women. 
The relationship between NGOs and rural poor women derivatively involves the question 
of legitimacy and accountability. But the question of legitimacy and accountability fundamentally 
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deals with the relation between donor agencies, government, and NGOs. At the same time, rural 
poor women become the most vulnerable to anything that lacks transparency. It reduces their 
capability because of Bangladeshi NGOs’ over-enjoyment of an environment where accountability 
is absent and in which they can extend their evil hands to take away their borrowers’ means of 
food accumulation and to break their houses. So, my point, in this respect, is that no or minimum 
accountability of NGOs in Bangladesh allows them to misuse or abuse their power. Because of 
this power, they can take away the means of food or break home of rural poor people, which are 
the ultimate marks of shame and dishonor. Consequently, the lack of accountability or 
transparency leads to a relationship between NGOs and rural poor women which cannot be based 
on trust, which is foundational. Thus, the absence of a proper trusting relationship between NGOs 
and rural poor women reduces the capabilities of rural people due to NGOs’ over-enjoyment of 
unaccountability to governments, donors, and the general public. 
Some practical implications for the NGOs (and their micro-credit programs) 
As mentioned, NGOs and their micro-credit activities disturb social solidarity in rural Bangladesh 
by their massive supervision mechanism they employ in order to sustain their trusting relationship 
with their debtors. It shows that in order to establish a proper trusting relationship with rural poor 
women, they should rethink their supervision strategy. As Sherratt (2016: xix) says, “To become 
ethical, and more effective, the bulk of microfinance needs to change direction from where it is.” 
The beginning of the change of direction should be to abandon the use of group liability condition 
because “it can turn the borrower’s lending group into unsupervised, vigilante loan collection 
agents” (Sherratt, 2016: 171). They should also consider poor people’s affordability when they 
collect loan repayments. It would ensure an environment in which poor women happily and 
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willingly take and repay loans.28 Ensuring this kind of environment would contribute to creating a 
trusting relationship between NGOs and rural poor women. 
Through financial education arranged for both parties, this kind of trusting relationship 
between NGOs and rural poor women and thus, social solidarity among villagers can be increased. 
To rural poor women, financial education is important because they can learn why and how to 
properly use the loans. One of the goals of financial education is to teach them the need to repay 
their loans: if they do not repay or misuse the loans, then the NGOs may not be able to help them 
in the future as they would have fewer and fewer resources to help others.29 Therefore, financial 
education should be a mechanism of empathy, i.e., taking a rural poor woman's viewpoint through 
which NGO officials would know the struggles these women are going through, and take 
constructive initiatives accordingly. In this regard, financial education for the NGO officials or 
leaders becomes important to be informed about how to behave with rural poor women, how to 
collect default loans without being aggressive, why the traditional social values are important, etc. 
Another way by which NGOs can acquire better knowledge about whether their loans are 
really helping the poor is taking a perspective of marginalized people, as Chowdhury and Willmott 
(2019: 127) suggest30. When NGO officials consider their activities through the lens of poor 
people’s perspective, they may feel more empathy towards the poor and marginalized. Hence, they 
will think twice before taking harsh measures like house-breaking against the loan defaulters. By 
not employing harsh measures, NGOs would gain poor people’s confidence which is necessary for 
any healthy and trusting relationship. 
I also recommend that sound initiatives at the policymaking level would make NGOs in 
Bangladesh more accountable. However, I am very much aware of the risk of taking any measures 
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at the government level to make NGOs activities transparent where the government itself is not 
transparent. So, transparency is possibly NGOs’ own responsibility that would lead them to not 
violating the trust that they claim they put in the poorest of the poor in Bangladesh. 
One way of ensuring transparency is through a nexus between NGOs, government, and 
poor people. I have in mind the sort of small cooperatives led by poor people as suggested by Anu 
Muhammad31 that would work as a meeting place for representatives of NGOs, government, and 
poor people. But unlike Muhammad, I think NGOs can contribute to these cooperatives by 
sponsoring them. Though they loan to these small cooperatives, they are not responsible for 
monitoring and transparency. Local people would oversee these issues. But the responsibility of 
the government is to oversee that within these environments local people do not become NGOs’ 
puppets and comprador class. Thus, we may see the presence of transparency in NGOs’ activities 
that would ensure a proper use of trust by making NGOs accountable to government, donor 
agencies, and general people, and by delimiting their power the use of which enables them to 
expand substantial unfreedoms. 
Conclusion 
This study shows that Drèze and Sen (2013) are not entirely correct in their apparent glorification32 
of the roles of NGOs in Bangladesh that they think contribute to Bangladesh’s better standing in 
many social development indicators than India, though the former is economically poorer than the 
latter. They claim that the reasons for the social achievements of Bangladesh are shifts in gender 
outlook, giving special attention to basic healthcare and elementary education needs, and giving 
importance to the development of many social norms in healthcare, education, and relevant sectors 
through public communication and community mobilization. But to make these three factors 
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possible, together with the government, they give credit to NGOs. That is, NGOs play a significant 
role in Bangladesh's social development by enhancing women's capabilities. Throughout the 
article, attention has been given to this issue. It seems to me that in their presentation, Drèze and 
Sen (2013) leave out and/or deemphasize the points that are problematic for NGOs, especially for 
their micro-credit programs. To serve my purpose, I have tried to show that one of the root causes 
of the contested roles of NGOs in Bangladesh is the very norm – i.e., trust – that they use to 
rationalize their strategy of giving loans to the poorest of the poor without taking any collateral. 
In order to show that the trusting relationship between NGOs in Bangladesh and rural poor 
women is problematic, I have argued that NGOs’ use of trust disturbs social solidarity in rural 
Bangladesh mainly because of their massive supervision mechanism they undertake to sustain the 
so-called trusting relationship between them and their debtors. Connected with this lies one of the 
major contributions of the paper that shows how micro-credit programs of NGOs form a sense of 
distrust among Bangladeshi poor villagers which, in effect, undermines indigenous social 
solidarity norms. A growing sense of distrust among Bangladeshi poor villagers damages social 
solidarity also because it creates a tension between local norms and NGOs’ neoliberalist values of 
“discipline, efficiency and competitiveness,” which NGOs attempt to influence villagers through 
their numerous social engineering programs, which are basically the state’s responsibility. 
Relevant to this claim, I have attempted to show that NGO monitoring has some psychological 
impacts on their clients that also contribute to disturbing social solidarity. Consequently, the 
trusting relationship between NGOs and rural poor women in Bangladesh is transformed into a 
relationship of domination and subordination. The last claim that I have endeavored to justify is 
that NGOs’ promotion of the so-called trusting relationship between them and rural poor women 
in order to offer loans to the latter reduces people’s capabilities. In this context, another important 
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contribution of the paper to the current micro-credit literature is visible: the extension of empirical 
works of Lamia Karim, Rashedur Chowdhury (and Hugh Willmott), Palash Kamruzzaman, Anu 
Muhammad, and Jude L. Fernando to critique Drèze and Sen’s glorification of NGOs where I have 
shown uniquely, using the capabilities approach of Sen himself, how their glorification of NGOs 
is undermined by the questionable activities of micro-credit programs. 
However, there are options that NGOs should consider in order to deal with the criticisms 
I have raised. I have laid out some practical implications for the NGOs which would be useful in 
order to face these criticisms. I have proposed dropping the use of group liability for individual 
loans. I have also proposed poor-people-led cooperatives where government and NGOs also have 
roles, which is a beneficial alternative to the way NGOs currently function. I have also argued that 
setting up a financial education program for rural poor women and NGO officials would improve 
the trusting relationships between them and, in turn, improve social solidarity among villagers. I 
understand, however, that it would be arrogant to claim that my alternative is better than the way 
NGOs and their micro-credit programs are functioning at the moment. In this regard, further 
studies are needed to see what the best alternative is to serve the interests of poor people. 
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1 I mainly focus on the Grameen Bank (GB) micro-credit model. Lamia Karim (2008: 9) offers the 
following definition of micro-credit, “In development rhetoric, micro-credit is the extension of 
small loans to women for income-generating projects and has been eulogized as a magic bullet of 
poverty alleviation.” Similarly, Rashedur Chowdhury and Hugh Willmott (2019: 123) mention 
that “[i]t is widely accepted in developing countries, such as Bangladesh, where NGOs, operating 
as quasi corporations under a veil of benevolence, have deployed microcredit as a development 
tool that it intended to eradicate poverty and empower poor women.” 
2 Some people might want to see a contrast between non-micro-credit nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) services – such as education and healthcare – with micro-credit services 
provided by the same NGOs (or at least by GB) and the values they promote to see how they 
compare with micro-credit services that I claim to be promoted. Although I believe that such a 
comparison would promote discussion in many respects, considering my intent in this paper, I feel 
it may be beyond the reach of the current paper. Rather, it needs another project. So, for the future, 
I would leave it. Nonetheless, the absence of such a comparison does not bias the research I 
propose in the paper since my purpose in this paper is to challenge Drèze and Sen’s glorification 
of the roles of NGOs in Bangladesh by showing that this glorification is undermined by different 
practices of Bangladeshi NGOs’ micro-credit programs. So, I simply need to concentrate on NGO 
micro-credit services that proves that Drèze and Sen’s glorification of the roles of NGOs in 
Bangladesh leaves out and/or deemphasizes other problems, such as the bad practices of various 
Bangladeshi NGO micro-credit programs. 
3 See for details, Taylor (1984). 
4 The argument that while NGOs help people gain access to many resources such as education, 
healthcare, jobs, credit, etc., we see the weakening of state sovereignty being put into perspective 
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in depth in the section entitled “Trust, psychological effects of NGO supervision, and social 
solidarity.” This issue also comes back in the section entitled “Drèze and Sen's glorification of 
NGOs and Sen's capabilities approach are in tension,” particularly when I am going to discuss how 
NGOs are undermining the democracy of a state. 
5 The contributions of foreign remittance and readymade garments industry to GDP in Bangladesh 
are 6.74% (in the fiscal year 2015-2016; calculated by the author taking data from the Bangladesh 
Bank website, https://www.bb.org.bd/) and 10% (Islam et al., 2016: 110), respectively. In 
readymade garments industry, rural illiterate women workers are 85% (Islam et al., 2016: 110). 
Hence, foreign remittance and readymade garments industry help increase women’s empowerment 
which is an indicator that their capabilities are also expanding. 
6 Scheduling of regular meetings differs from NGO to NGO: GB and ASA arrange meetings on a 
weekly basis but BRAC and Proshika arrange bi-weekly and monthly meetings, respectively 
(Karim, 2008: 27). 
7 Karim regards it as “the ultimate shame of dishonor in rural society” (2008: 19). 
8 See, for example, Tauhid-Uz-Zaman (2017). 
9 See, for example, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24128096 (Accessed 19 January 2019). 
One thing we should bear in mind here is that there is no comprehensive ethnographic analysis, at 
least to my knowledge, of how many suicide and organ-selling incidents occurred as a result of 
the inability to repay micro-credit loans and thus, save the family honor. What is more important 
for the current project is that we have seen cases of suicide and organ-selling due to the failure of 
micro-credit loan repayments, which is extremely bad and evident enough to undermine the 
glorification of the roles of NGOs in Bangladesh by Drèze and Sen. 
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10 According to the NGO Affairs Bureau of Bangladesh (NGOAB), in the fiscal year 2015-2016, 
the released cumulative amount of foreign funds stood at $7,952,500,843.62 for 23,217 NGO 
projects. Available at: goo.gl/TSPFam (Accessed on 19 January 2019). Despite receiving millions 
of dollars as donations with very low interest rates, interest rates of loans from Bangladeshi NGOs’ 
micro-credit programs are very high. Qazi Kholikuzzaman Ahmad, the current chairman of Palli 
Karma-Sahayak Foundation which is a microfinance oversight agency, describes micro-credit as 
a “death trap” for the poor. As he states, “Interest on repayments begin at around 15%, but it is a 
flat rate and can soon rise to anything between 40% and 100%” (Cited in Melik, 2010). Moreover, 
Fernando (2006: 23) mentions that because of the high interest rates, “[i]n some Bangladeshi 
villages, the NGOs are known as “new Zamindars” and “New East India Company,” indicating 
that they are purely interested in squeezing the “blood” from the poor.” 
11 See, for a similar discussion, Edwards and Hulme (1996: 3). 
12 See also Gregson and Ferdous (2015: 251) and Chowdhury (2017: 942). Chowdhury and 
Willmott (2019: 126) label this shadow government as “a kind of parallel government.” 
13 Anu Muhammad (interviewed in Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 133) says, “The 
unprecedented rise of NGOs in Bangladesh can be understood in the context of market failure 
and/or government failure. These failures played a key role in the expansion of NGOs. NGOs grew 
as an ostensible alternative to both the government and the market.” 
14 To know more about Yunus and GB, see Yunus and Jolis (2007). 
15 See http://www.grameen.com/introduction/ (Accessed on 19 January 2019). 
16 Amartya Sen (1999: 201) praises GB’s success of recovering loans, which is 98 percent. 
However, Fernando (2006) is skeptical about whether high repayment rates can be called a success. 
As he says, 
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High repayment rates do not necessarily mean that there is an increase in the 
borrowers’ incomes. The nominal identity of the borrower and the repayment rates 
do not reveal how and where the credit is invested, the sources of repayment, and 
the final beneficiaries of credit. These practices involve a complex social network, 
rather than a simple transaction between the lending agency and the borrower. Such 
institutional networks are important to the borrowers, as they assist them to become 
creditworthy, provide employment, and provide emergency funds to make timely 
repayments. These networks limit the borrowers’ control over their loans and the 
income. They are also means through which income and repayments are 
appropriated by the moneylenders, traders and the NGOs, and the NGO which, in 
turn, transfers them to families and localities that promise better long rates of 
repayments. This exacerbates the economic inequalities within the communities 
and between different localities (Fernando, 2006: 22). 
17  I return to this point in the next section since it requires a separate discussion. 
18 Researchers have found that anxiety increases as monitoring increases. Studies in the context of 
employers’ surveillance on their employees are available (see Smith et al., 1992; Stanton, and 
Barnes-Farrell, 1996). 
19 Although there is no psychological study to indicate the decreasing effect of massive supervision 
on trusting relationship of NGOs and rural poor women, studies are available that show that 
people’s trust in their leader decreases when they find out that they are being watched (see Subašić 
et al., 2011). Such studies inspire me to conjecture about the reverse relation between trust and 
surveillance in the context of NGO-rural women relationship I have just mentioned. 
20 Granick (2017) argues that the very knowledge of being watched can change one’s behavior. 
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21 Chowdhury (2017: 943) mentions a similar gatekeeping role played by field-level NGO workers 
albeit in the context of the Rana Plaza collapse that occurred on April 24, 2013 in Savar, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
22 Chowdhury (2017: 943) mentions an incident of NGO silencing in the context of the Rana Plaza 
collapse: “the victims [of the collapse] became heavily dependent on elite NGOs for compensation 
and rehabilitation since these NGOs controlled various aspects of these processes, which meant 
that the victims lost their voice on the ground.” 
23 For being parallel government, NGOs get funds from various multinational corporations and 
donor agencies to help people rehabilitate during situations, such as Cyclone Sidr and the Rana 
Plaza collapse. But this, as Chowdhury (2017: 943) calls, is “subcontracting of morality.” 
24 Q. K. Ahmad (an economist and developmentalist) regards that political leaders, bureaucrats, 
consultants, and various other members of Bangladeshi urban civil society form a comprador class 
“who always accept external approaches and enjoy benefits from these” (cited in Kamruzzaman, 
2013: 40). Whereas Ahmad discusses the formation of a comprador class in the context of urban 
civil society, I think the formation of such a class is also possible in rural areas. 
25 In a non-voluntary association, actors with lesser power and opportunities are forced to trust the 
powerful actor. It can forcefully lead the lesser powerful actors to cheat in order to survive. For a 
relevant reading, see Nooteboom (2007). 
26 Social moral values/rules are “informally established and socially enforced standards that 
members of a group generally treat as properly regulating their conduct” (Cureton, 2012: 691). 
27 The book referred here is Rahman (2001). 
28 See for a similar line of thought and for details, Muhammad (interviewed in  Chowdhury and 
Willmott, 2019: 137). 
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29 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers to bring this issue to my attention. 
30 Chowdhury and Willmott (2019: 127) suggest researchers to study NGOs from the perspective 
of marginalized people. But I suggest that NGOs themselves should also take this perspective in 
their activities. 
31 See for details, Muhammad (interviewed in  Chowdhury and Willmott, 2019: 137-138). 
32 This glorification becomes more evident if we consider the fact that the NGO sector is not the 
only non-government sector that increases the capabilities of village women. Two other important 
factors that enhance their capabilities are foreign remittances and readymade garments industry 
(see also Note 5). 
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